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NOTES
court based its decision in the instant case, seems to be con-
sistent with civilian principles of tort liability by providing, in
part, that "anyone who is injured or damaged by the agent or
broker by any wrongful act done in the furtherance of such busi-
ness or by any fraud or misrepresentation by the agent or broker
may sue for the recovery of the damage before any court of com-
petent jurisdiction."' 0 The court found that the statute placed
real estate brokerage in the status of a public business, vested
with a public interest and subject to police regulation. This being
true, it reasoned that the defendant owed a duty to the public
and since the plaintiff was a member of the public, he was en-
titled to have his offer communicated by the defendants to the
vendor.I7 Although the court's action could perhaps be sustained
under other theories, both at common law and under civilian
principles, it is submitted that the ground on which the decision
was based, that of giving effect to the legislative policy of re-
quiring high standards of conduct by real estate agents, is sound.
Charles W. Howard, Jr.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - HAZARDOUS NATURE OF
EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS
Plaintiff, a saleslady and beauty operator employed by a
retail concessionaire aboard a steamship, was injured' and
brought suit under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act,2
alleging total and permanent disability. She contended that the
presence of the employer's concession aboard a steam-powered
vessel rendered it a hazardous business within the coverage of
the act, despite the fact that her employer neither owned nor
16. LA. R.S. 37:1447 (1950).
17. Cf. Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So.2d 4 (1946), cited by the majority
in the instant case. The court there found that the Florida statutes regulating
real estate brokerage created a duty of fair dealing to the plaintiff by the de-
fendant broker, inasmuch as the statutes granted a virtual monopoly to engage
in a lucrative business and required that applicants for brokerage licenses be
trustworthy, honest, and bear a reputation for fair dealing.
1. The sequence of events surrounding the accident were as follows: Plaintiff
was sunbathing on the ship's deck when, upon attempting to arise, a sudden roll
of the ship caused her to slip and fall. Such circumstances present very unusual
and somewhat difficult problems as to whether the injury was one "arising out
of" and "in the course of" the employment. The manner in which the court dis-
poses of these problems in granting recovery is very interesting, although un-
fortunately beyond the scope of this Note.
2. LA. R.S. 23:1021 et seq. (1950). For complete discussion of hazardous
businesses, see MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE c. 5 (1951).
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operated the vessel. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of plaintiff and the insurer appealed. Held, affirmed. The fact
that plaintiff was required as a part of her regular duties to be
aboard an engine-powered vessel was sufficient to render the
retail merchandise business hazardous within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Rosenquist v, New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 78 So.2d 225 (La. App. 1955).
In order for a business to be classified as hazardous within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it must be
either specifically designated as hazardous by the act or its op-
erations must involve certain enumerated hazardous features.3
Businesses which are not included in either of these categories,
even though they are clearly hazardous in fact,4 can be brought
within the scope of the act only by express agreement between
employer and employee. 5 Sometimes, however, desired flexibility
in the interpretation of the act can be achieved by resort to the
so-called "omnibus provision" which renders a business hazard-
ous if it entails the "operation of boilers, furnaces, engines and
other forms of machinery."' Louisiana courts have frequently
relied upon this provision to extend the coverage of the act to
businesses which would otherwise be regarded as non-hazardous. 7
This has been especially evident with regard to those businesses
which entail the operation of motor vehicles.8 In the leading case
on this subject,9 the court was able to regard a truck driver as
3. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950).
4. Hecker v. Betz, 172 So. 816 (La. App. 1937) ; Adkins v. Holsum Cafeteria,
159 So. 758 (La. App. 1935); Foret v. Paul Ziblich Co., 137 So. 366 (La. App..
1931); Dejan v. Ujffy, 14 Orl. App. 230 (La. App. 1917).
5. See LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950), providing in part: "The question of whether
or not a trade, business, or occupation not named herein is hazardous may be
determined by agreement between the employer and employee or by submission at
the instance of either to the court having jurisdiction over the employer in a civil
case. The decision of the court shall not be retroactive in its effect."
6. LA. R.S. 23:1035 (1950).
7. Scott v. Dalton Co., 1 So.2d 412 (La. App. 1941) (in cases where em-
ployees are injured in a business not mentioned, the court may consider the duties
required, and whether they are hazardous, although the business of the employer
is not listed as hazardous) : Crews v. Levitan Smart Shops, 171 So. 608 (La.
App. 1937) (the fact that the defendant's business of operating a clothing store
is not generally hazardous was held to be of no importance since in conjunction
with the store he operated a gasoline engine) ; see Byas v. Hotel Bentley, Inc.,
157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1924) (hotel employee).
8. Collins v. Spielman, 200 La. 586, 8 So.2d 608 (1942) ; Haddad v. Commer-
cial Motor Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197 (1920) ; Pierce v. Farm Develop-
ment Corp., 39 So.2d 154 (La. App. 1949) ; Ridgell v. Tangipahoa Parish School
Board, 17 So.2d 55 (La. App. 1944) ; Moritz K.C.S. Drug Co., 149 So. 244 (La.
App. 1933) ; Richardson v. Crescent Forwarding & Transportation Co., 135 So.
688 (La. App. 1931).
9. Haddad v. Commercial Motor Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197 (1920).
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engaged in a business entailing the "operation of machinery"
simply by classifying the entire motor vehicle as a "machine."
By this approach, coverage has been extended to include loaders 0
and riders" of motor vehicles as persons engaged in hazardous
occupations.' 2 Thus it now appears that the mere fact that plain-
tiff is near machinery while in the course of his employment may
be sufficient to render his employment hazardous. 13 However,
several recent cases involving the operation of motor vehicles
have required, as a prerequisite to a determination of whether a
particular business is hazardous, that the motor vehicle involved
either be owned by the employer or at least be operated in his
business by one of his employees.' 4 In these cases, the mere fact
that the businesses involved exposed their employees to vehicles
owned and operated by third persons was not regarded as suffi-
cient to bring the businesses within the scope of the act.
In the instant case, the court apparently characterized the
entire vessel on which the retail merchandise business was con-
ducted as a "machine" and regarded plaintiff's situation as
analogous to that of a rider aboard a motor vehicle. 5 More im-
portantly, however, the court failed to require, as an essential
element of such a "hazardous business," that the vessel involved
10. Snear v. Eiserloh, 144 So. 265 (La. App. 1932) ; Richardson v. Crescent
Forwarding & Transportation Co., 135 So. 688 (La. App. 1931).
11. Steiffel v. Valentine Sugars, 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938); Comeaux
v. South Coast Corp., 175 So. 177 (La. App. 1937) ; Crews v. Levitan Smart
Shops, 171 So. 608 (La. App. 1937); contra: Lewis v. A. Moresi Co., 196 So.
70 (La. App. 1940) ; Allen v. Yantis, 196 So. 530 (La. App. 1940) ; Tregre v.
Kratzer, 148 So. 271 (La. App. 1933) (farming vehicles involved).
12. In the great majority of cases arising on the subject the plaintiff has been
the driver of the vehicle in question and accordingly, great emphasis has been
placed upon the operation of "engines and other forms of machinery" as a basis
for recovery, rather than upon other dangers such as traffic hazards. See Com-
ment, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 415, 418 (1.946) : "Emphasis has always been
on operation of the engine."
13. Ryland v. R. & P. Const. Co., 19 So.2d 349 (La. App. 1944) (night watch-
man whose duty was to guard dormant machinery) ; Washington v. Sewerage &
Water Board, 180 So. 199 (La. App. 1938) (water boy on construction job);
Dyer v. Rapides Lbr. Co., 154 La. 1091, 98 So. 677 (1923) (night watchman
who cleaned dormant engines). See MALONE, WORIKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 117 (1951) : "It is not necessary that the work itself be hazardous
if its performance . . . obliges him to be near machinery or substances which
characterize the business as hazardous."
14. Fields v. General Casualty Co. of America, 36 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1948),
criticized, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 192 (1951) ; Reazor v. First National Life
Insurance Co., 28 So.2d 527 (La. App. 1946).
15. Rosenquist v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 78 So.2d 225, 228 (1955)
"[A]ny employee whose duties bring him in contact with motor-driven vehicles is
protected by the workman's compensation law. This being so, we can think of no
reason why a business conducted on an ocean-going vessel should not be held to be
hazardous."
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be either owned or operated by plaintiff's employer. 16 Inasmuch
as the steamship was absolutely essential to the operation of
plaintiff's business and, in effect, rendered the business one
which entailed 17 "the operation of engines and other forms of
machinery," the finding of the court seems justifiable. Although
the court did not indicate whether it would extend the reasoning
of the instant case to other situations, the decision could pos-
sibly be regarded as an abandonment of the requirement that the
vehicle be either owned or operated by the employer for the busi-
ness to be hazardous. If the result of the instant case is followed,
there is a possibility the courts will extend coverage to curb-
service establishments, drive-in theaters, and other similar busi-
nesses that frequently expose their employees to the dangers of
motor vehicles owned and operated by third persons. If they do
so, however, the courts should take great care to restrict cover-
age to those businesses in which the operation of motor vehicles
is absolutely vital and to deny coverage to those which merely
expose their employees to motor vehicles in an incidental manner.
With this restriction as a safeguard, the modified rule should
pose no threat of abolition to the distinction between hazardous
and non-hazardous businesses and there should be no fear of ad-
ministrative difficulties.
David M. Ellison, Jr.
16. Cf. Fields v. General Casualty Co., 36 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1948) (in
denying recovery to an employee injured while loading a customer's truck, the
court emphasized that "in all of the cases cited by counsel for plaintiff, the em-
ployer either owned or operated, or borrowed and operated, or used and con-
trolled the motor vehicle").
. 17. See The Vork of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term -
Torts and Workmen'8 Compensation, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REV1EW 191, 192 (1951)
"[T]he act requires only that the business must 'entail ... the operation of ...
engines and other forms of machinery.' The dictionary defines 'entail' as 'to in-
volve as a necessary accompaniment or result.' It seems that when a proprietor ...
profits from the regular presence and use of such vehicle his business may fairly
be said to be to 'entail' the operation of motor vehicles, even though his employees
do not drive them.
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